Impact of Policy Design on Workflow Resiliency Computation Time by Mace J et al.
  
COMPUTING 
SCIENCE 
Impact of Policy Design on Workflow Resiliency Computation Time 
 
 
John C. Mace, Charles Morisset and Aad van Moorsel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES 
 
No. CS-TR-1469 May 2015 
TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES 
              
 
 
No. CS-TR-1469  May, 2015 
 
 
Impact of Policy Design on Workflow Resiliency Computation Time 
 
 
J. C. Mace, C. Morisset and A. Moorsel 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Workflows are complex operational processes that include security constraints 
restricting which users can perform which tasks. An improper user-task assignment 
may prevent the completion of the workflow, and deciding such an assignment at 
runtime is known to be complex, especially when considering user unavailability 
(known as the resiliency problem). Therefore, design tools are required that allow fast 
evaluation of workflow resiliency. In this paper, we propose a methodology for 
workflow designers to assess the impact of the security policy on computing the 
resiliency of a workflow. Our approach relies on encoding a workflow into the 
probabilistic model-checker PRISM, allowing its resiliency to be evaluated by 
solving a Markov Decision Process.  We observe and illustrate that adding or 
removing some constraints has a clear impact on the resiliency computation time, and 
we compute the set of security constraints that can be artificially added to a security 
policy in order to reduce the computation time while maintaining the resiliency.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2015 Newcastle University. 
Printed and published by Newcastle University, 
Computing Science, Claremont Tower, Claremont Road, 
Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU, England. 
Bibliographical details 
MACE, J. C; MORISSET, C; MOORSEL, A; 
Impact of Policy Design on Workflow Resiliency Computation Time  
[By] J. C. Mace, C. Morisset, A. Moorsel 
Newcastle upon Tyne: Newcastle University: Computing Science, 2015. 
 
(Newcastle University, Computing Science, Technical Report Series, No. CS-TR-1469) 
 
Added entries 
 
NEWCASTLE UNIVERSITY 
Computing Science. Technical Report Series.  CS-TR-1469 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Workflows are complex operational processes that include security constraints restricting which users can perform 
which tasks. An improper user-task assignment may prevent the completion of the workflow, and deciding such an 
assignment at runtime is known to be complex, especially when considering user unavailability (known as the 
resiliency problem). Therefore, design tools are required that allow fast evaluation of workflow resiliency. In this 
paper, we propose a methodology for workflow designers to assess the impact of the security policy on computing 
the resiliency of a workflow. Our approach relies on encoding a workflow into the probabilistic model-checker 
PRISM, allowing its resiliency to be evaluated by solving a Markov Decision Process.  We observe and illustrate 
that adding or removing some constraints has a clear impact on the resiliency computation time, and we compute 
the set of security constraints that can be artificially added to a security policy in order to reduce the computation 
time while maintaining the resiliency.  
 
 
About the authors 
 
 
John Mace is a research assistant at Newcastle University, working with Charles Morisset and Aad van Moorsel 
on devising new tools and methodologies to analyse the impact of information security using, in particular security 
ontology development tools and more formal techniques to quantify security impact on workflows. John 
completed a BSc (Hons) in Computing Science at Newcastle University in 2010 during which time he received a 
Scott Logic prize for computer excellence for his year two performance. He was also awarded the School of 
Computing Science prize for best overall performance in year three. John is due to submit his PhD thesis mid-
2015. 
 
Charles Morisset is a Senior Research Associate at Newcastle University, working with Aad van Moorsel on 
quantitative aspects of security, in particular in the decision making process and in access control mechanisms. 
Charles received is PhD from Universite Pierre et Marie Curie - Paris VI in France in 2007, on the topic of 
formalisation of access control systems. He then worked from 2007 to 2009 at the United Nations University, in 
Macau SAR, China, on formal methods for software engineering, after which he joined the Information Security 
Group at Royal Holloway, University of London, to work on risk-based access control until 2011. From 2011 to 
2013, he worked at the Istituto di Informatica e Telematica in Pisa, Italy, on formal methods and access control, 
and he joined the Centre for Cybercrime and Computer Security at Newcastle University in 2013. 
 
Aad van Moorsel is a Professor in Distributed Systems and Head of School at the School of Computing Science in 
Newcastle University. His group conducts research in security, privacy and trust. Almost all of the group's 
research contains elements of quantification, be it through system measurement, predictive modelling or on-line 
adaptation. Aad worked in industry from 1996 until 2003, first as a researcher at Bell Labs/Lucent Technologies in 
Murray Hill and then as a research manager at Hewlett-Packard Labs in Palo Alto, both in the United States. He 
got his PhD in computer science from Universiteit Twente in The Netherlands (1993) and has a Masters in 
mathematics from Universiteit Leiden, also in The Netherlands. After finishing his PhD he was a postdoc at the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Illinois, USA, for two years. Aad became the Head of the School of 
Computing Science in 2012. 
 
 
 
 
Suggested keywords 
 
WORKFLOW SATISFIABILITY PROBLEM 
PROBABILISTIC MODEL CHECKER 
USER AVAILABILITY 
Impact of Policy Design on Workflow Resiliency
Computation Time
John C. Mace, Charles Morisset, and Aad van Moorsel
School of Computing Science,
Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne,
NE1 7RU, United Kingdom
{j.c.mace,charles.morisset,aad.vanmoorsel}@ncl.ac.uk
Abstract. Workflows are complex operational processes that include
security constraints restricting which users can perform which tasks. An
improper user-task assignment may prevent the completion of the work-
flow, and deciding such an assignment at runtime is known to be complex,
especially when considering user unavailability (known as the resiliency
problem). Therefore, design tools are required that allow fast evaluation
of workflow resiliency. In this paper, we propose a methodology for work-
flow designers to assess the impact of the security policy on computing
the resiliency of a workflow. Our approach relies on encoding a work-
flow into the probabilistic model-checker PRISM, allowing its resiliency
to be evaluated by solving a Markov Decision Process. We observe and
illustrate that adding or removing some constraints has a clear impact
on the resiliency computation time, and we compute the set of security
constraints that can be artificially added to a security policy in order to
reduce the computation time while maintaining the resiliency.
Keywords: Workflow Satisfiability Problem, Probabilistic Model Checker,
User Availability
1 Introduction
Workflows are used in multiple domains, for instance business environments,
to represent complex operational processes [7, 14], or healthcare environments,
to represent the different protocols that must be respected [25]. There is also
an increasing interest in scientific environments, where platforms like eScience
Central [17] allow domain experts to define scientific processes, which are then
automatically deployed and executed. Although the exact definition can change
from one context to another, a workflow typically consists of a partially ordered
set of tasks, where each task must be executed by a user [1]. Workflow designers
may have to impose complex security policies, restricting which users can per-
form which tasks. This includes static user-task permissions but also dynamic
constraints, such as separation or binding of duty constraints, which indicate
tasks that cannot be performed by the same user [19], or tasks that must be
performed by the same user [9], respectively.
In general, purely granting an assignment request for a task based on its user
permissions and constraints with previously executed tasks may not be enough.
Assigning a specific user to a task can prevent the completion of the workflow
at a later stage, meaning in general, all possible options have to be considered.
Checking that a particular user-task assignment is both valid and allows the
workflow to finish is known as the workflow satisfiability problem (WSP) and
has been shown to be NP-hard [12,27], indicating the runtime assignment process
may be computationally demanding.
Workflow resiliency extends the WSP by considering users may become un-
available at runtime, a concept first introduced by Wang and Li [27]. This prob-
lem was later refined by Mace et al. [22], who considered a more quantitative
approach, where each user is associated with a probability to become unavail-
able, and showed that calculating the resiliency of a workflow was equivalent
to finding the optimal policy of a Markov Decision Process (MDP). The value
returned by the value function of the MDP provides a measure of likely workflow
completion. Therefore, evaluating resiliency at runtime can ensure assignments
are granted only if the rest of the workflow can be satisfied with a probability
above a given resiliency threshold.
Indeed, contrary to the WSP, which can be solved at design time, maximis-
ing the resiliency of workflow requires to re-compute at each step the expected
resiliency, in order to adjust the user-task assignment to the current availability
of the users. Hence, evaluating resiliency for assignments at runtime has itself an
impact on workflow execution time. Recent optimising approaches for the WSP,
such as [12], and algorithms and tools, such as model-checking [2], have been
proposed, however, they are not directly concerned with user availability.
In this paper, we investigate how to improve the computation time for the
resiliency of a workflow at runtime. In particular, we observe that adding or
removing security components to the security policy has a clear impact on the
resiliency computation time, that can be either increased or decreased. We there-
fore propose a methodology to help a workflow designer assess the impact of such
policy changes. We apply this methodology to show how to compute the set of
security constraints that can be added to a workflow, without impacting the
actual resiliency while significantly decreasing the resiliency computation time.
After discussing the related work (Section 2) and formally defining the no-
tion of workflow resiliency (Section 3), we present the contributions of this paper,
which are: the automated analysis of workflow resiliency, using an encoding in
the probabilistic model checker PRISM [20] of the theoretical approach presented
in [22] (Section 4); the empirical assessment of policy changes on the resiliency
computation time (Section 5); the methodology to calculate a set of artificial
security policy constraints, in order to reduce the resiliency computation time
while maintaining the actual resiliency value, and its illustration on an example
(Section 6). We believe that building efficient tools for the analysis of workflows
will be helpful to workflow designers, by helping them understanding the com-
plexity of the workflow they are building, and estimating the potential runtime
impact of their security policy designs.
2 Related Work
A number of previous studies on workflow resiliency appear in the literature.
Wang and Li took a first step in [27] to quantify resiliency by addressing the
problem of whether a workflow can still complete in the absence of users and
defined a workflow as k resilient to all failures of up to k users across an entire
workflow. Lowalekar et al. in [21] use security attributes to choose the most
favourable between multiple assignments exhibiting the same level of k resiliency.
Basin et al. consider the impact of security on resiliency by allowing user-
task permission changes to overcome user failure induced workflow blocks, at a
quantifiable cost [5, 6]. Wainer et al. also consider in [26] the explicit overriding
of security constraints in workflows, by defining a notion of privilege. Similarly,
Bakkali [4] suggests overcoming user unavailability through selected delegation
and the placement of criticality values over workflows.
A mechanism for the specification and enforcement of workflow authorisation
constraints is given by Bertino et al. in [8] whilst Ayed et al. discuss security
policy definition and deployment for workflow management systems in [3]. Model
checking has been used by Armando et al. [2] to formally model and automati-
cally analyse security constrained business processes to ensure they meet given
security properties. He et al. in [15] also use modelling techniques to analyse secu-
rity constraint impact in terms of computational time and resources on workflow
execution.
Herbert et al. in [16] model workflows expressed in BPMN as MDPs. The
probabilistic model checker PRISM is utilised to check various probabilistic prop-
erties such as reaching particular states of interest, or the occurrence and order-
ing of certain events. Calinescu et al. use PRISM to evaluate the Quality of
Service (QoS) delivered by dynamically composed service-based systems [11].
PRISM has also been used for identifying and recovering from runtime require-
ment violations in dynamically adaptable application software [10]. Quantitative
access control using partially-observable MDPs is presented by Martinelli et al.
in [24] which under uncertainty, aims to optimise the decision process for a se-
quence of access requests.
However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no current literature neither
on automatic analysis of workflow resiliency, nor on the analysis of how changes
to a workflow’s security policy impact resiliency computation, which is the focus
of this paper.
3 Workflow
In this section we provide our working definition of a workflow and describe the
process of assigning users to tasks whilst respecting the security policy, known
as the workflow satisfiability problem (WSP). We then describe the notion of
workflow resiliency which looks to solve the WSP under the assumption users
may become unavailable for future task assignments.
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Fig. 2. Running example security policy
3.1 Workflow Definition
We define here a workflow in similar fashion to Wang and Li [27] and Crampton
et al. [12]. A workflow firstly consists of a partially ordered set of tasks (T,<),
such that for any two tasks t, t′ ∈ T , if t < t′, then t must be performed before
t′ in any given instance of the workflow.
Each task needs to be assigned to a user in a given set U , and such an
assignment must respect a security policy. In general, a policy is a triple p =
(P, S,B) where:
– P ⊆ U ×T is a set of user-task permissions, such that (u, t) ∈ P if, and only
if u is allowed to perform t.
– S ⊆ T × T is a set of separations of duty, such that (t, t′) ∈ S if, and only if
the users assigned to t and t′ are distinct.
– B ⊆ T × T is a set of bindings of duty, such that (t, t′) ∈ B if, and only if
the same user is assigned to t and t′.
Definition 1 (Workflow). A workflow is a tuple w = (U, (T,<), p), where U
is a set of users, T is a partially ordered set of tasks, and p is a security policy.
Running example. As a running example to illustrate the different concepts
presented here, we consider the workflow w1 = (U1, (T1, <), p1), where U1 =
{u1, u2, u3, u4}, T1 = {t1, t2, t3, t4, t5} such that t1 < t2 < t3 < t5 and t1 < t4 <
t5, and the p1 is defined as the triple (P1, S1, B1) where:
– P1 = {(u1, t1), (u2, t1), (u2, t2), (u3, t2), (u1, t3),
(u2, t3), (u2, t4), (u4, t4), (u1, t5), (u4, t5)}
– S1 = {(t2, t4), (t3, t4), (t4, t5)}
– B1 = {(t1, t3)}
Figure 1 illustrates the task ordering over T1 and Figure 2 illustrates this security
policy, where a dotted arrow signifies a constraint between the tasks t and t′
labelled 6= to indicate a separation of duty, and = to indicate a binding of duty.
A label [ui, . . . , uj ] states the users that are authorised by P1 to execute t.
3.2 Workflow Satisfiability Problem
A workflow assignment is a relation A ⊆ U × T , such that (ui, ti) ∈ A indi-
cates that user ui is assigned to the task ti. Intuitively, A is valid when i) the
task ordering is respected; ii) all assignments are permitted by the user-task
permission; iii) separation and binding constraints are respected; iv) no task is
executed twice. More formally, given a workflow w = (U, (T,<), (P, S,B)), A is
a valid assignment, and in this case we write A ` w if, and only if the following
five conditions are met:
∀(u, t) ∈ A ∀t′ ∈ T t′ < t⇒ ∃u′ ∈ U (u′, t′) ∈ A (1)
A ⊆ P (2)
∀(t, t′) ∈ S ∃(u, t) ∈ A ∃(u′, t′) ∈ A⇒ u′ 6= u (3)
∀(t, t′) ∈ B ∃(u, t) ∈ A ∃(u′, t′) ∈ A⇒ u′ = u (4)
∀t ∈ T ∀u, u′ ∈ U (u, t) ∈ A ∧ (u′, t) ∈ A⇒ u = u′ (5)
A workflow assignment A is said to be a partial if it does not include an
assignment for every task in the workflow. For instance, in our running example,
{(u1, t1), (u3, t2), (u2, t4)} is a valid partial assignment whereas {(u1, t1), (u2, t2),
(u2, t4)} is not as it violates the separation of duty constraint between tasks t2
and t4. For a workflow to complete successfully, every task needs to be assigned
a user for execution. A workflow assignment A is therefore said to be complete,
if, and only if:
∀t ∈ T ∃u ∈ U (u, t) ∈ A (6)
The workflow satisfiability problem (WSP) consists of finding a complete and
valid assignment, and in some cases can be relatively simple. For instance, con-
sider a policy where S = B = ∅, i.e., where there are no separations or bindings
of duty. In this case, it is enough to assign each task t with a user u such that
(u, t) ∈ P . If there is no such user, the workflow is unsatisfiable. However, in gen-
eral, the WSP has been shown to be NP hard [27], i.e., roughly speaking, finding
a complete and valid assignment might require to check all possible assignments.
With our running example, imagine we want to find a complete assignment for
w1 and begin assigning users to tasks t1,t2 and t4 to form the partial assignment
A = {(u2, t1), (u3, t2), (u2, t4)}. Although this assignment is valid, there is no
user u such that A ∪ {(u, t3)} is also valid, meaning that the workflow cannot
finish. However with the partial assignment {(u2, t1), (u3, t2), (u4, t4)}, we can
add (u2, t3) and (u1, t5) to form a valid and complete assignment.
3.3 Workflow Resiliency
Solving the WSP assumes users will always be available for future tasks, how-
ever in practice, sickness, vacation, heavy workloads, etc., can cause users to be
unavailable for a given user-task assignment. It is important to take this into ac-
count when finding A for a given workflow. This is called the resiliency problem,
whether a workflow can be satisfied even when some users become absent.
Wang and Li defined an approach to calculate a valid assignment if one exists,
that is resilient to up to k users failing, in other words declaring a workflow to
be either k resilient or not [27]. This approach is rather binary as in many cases,
finding an assignment for a workflow that is resilient to every combination of k
user failures may be impossible. Yet finding a valid assignment that is resilient
in 9 out of 10 cases is arguably better than choosing a valid assignment that is
resilient in only 1 out of 10 cases.
The problem of resiliency adds another level of complexity to the WSP. For
instance, consider {(u1, t1), (u2, t2), (u1, t3), (u4, t4), (u1, t5)} ` w1 in our running
example, where u4 has a very high probability of failing at or before t4. If u4 does
fail, t4 cannot be reassigned to any other user meaning the workflow cannot fin-
ish. If we chose a different assignment {(u1, t1), (u3, t2), (u1, t3), (u4, t4), (u1, t5)} `
w1, intuitively the workflow is more resilient as t4 can be reassigned to u2 and
still finish if u4 did indeed fail. In [22], Mace et al introduce probabilistic user
failures and show that computing the optimal policy of an MDP is equivalent
to finding A ` w that maximises the value function. The value function returns
0 < v ≤ 1 if there exists A ` w where v indicates the probability of the workflow
to finish, or 0 otherwise.
Moreover, Mace et al define in [23] several user availability models and dis-
cuss the effects model choice can have on workflow resiliency analysis. In this
paper we consider a dynamic user availability model meaning any user who be-
comes unavailable for a task may become available again at any step later in the
workflow.
4 Computing Workflow Resiliency at Runtime
Although user availability is modelled in a probabilistic way, at runtime, a user
is either available or not. In other words, the resiliency of a workflow denotes
a prediction of completion, and not a level a completion: a workflow only ter-
minates if all tasks have been assigned to a user available for that task. When
the availability of users does not change at runtime, any valid assignment com-
puted before execution remains valid throughout execution. However, when user
availability is dynamic, the validity of an assignment might change during the
execution, and therefore a new assignment might need to be found.
According to Crampton and Khambhammettu [13], there are two main work-
flow execution models: workflow-driven execution model (WDEM), where users
are automatically assigned tasks to execute, and user-driven execution model
(UDEM), where users initiate requests to be assigned tasks at runtime. The im-
pact of dynamic user availability is slightly different between the two models:
with WDEM, intuitively, we want to continuously compute the most resilient
assignment, adapting to changes in user availability; Whereas with UDEM, we
want to ensure that a user asking to execute a specific task either belongs to the
most resilient assignment, or satisfies a threshold of resiliency.
With either model, resiliency might then need to be recomputed at runtime,
which can be done by solving a Markov Decision Process (MDP) [22]. There
are many ways to solve an MDP including dynamic programming (e.g. value
iteration) [18]. This technique is provided by the probabilistic model checking
tool PRISM, which enables the specification, construction and analysis of prob-
Select next
task t ∈ nextt
Select
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Check
(u, t)
Failed
Success[nextt = ∅]
[nextt 6= ∅] [(u, t) invalid]
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Deterministic transition
Non-deterministic transition
Probabilistic transition
Guard on transition[guard]
Fig. 3. Process computing the resiliency of a workflow, where nextt denotes the set of
tasks remaining to be executed.
abilistic models such as MDPs [20]. PRISM is an intuitive choice as it can model
both probabilistic and non-deterministic choice, and gives an efficient way to
solve an MDP whilst providing analysis data regarding computation overheads.
An overview of the PRISM modelling language is given in Appendix A.1.
The workflow assignment process is shown as a state diagram in Figure 3.
Each node represents a process state while each directed arrow between two
states s and s′ indicates a transition from state s to state s′. The assignment
process works as follows: 1) given a starting state the next unassigned task t in
the workflow is selected, where the set of possible tasks is represented by nextt.
Task selection is in general non-deterministic since several tasks can be the next
one (i.e. in the case of parallel execution). If all tasks have been assigned then
nextt = ∅; 2) When a task t is selected, an arbitrary user u is selected to be
assigned to t. The selection of u is non-deterministic as the MDP will essentially
try every user for each task assignment. 3) The user-task assignment (u, t) is then
checked to see whether it is valid; in other words whether u available and (u, t)
satisfies the workflow’s security policy p. This check is probabilistic, since user
availability is probabilistic. If (u, t) is valid, u is assigned to t and the process
starts again with the next task, otherwise the workflow terminates early.
The resiliency of the workflow is therefore computed as the maximal proba-
bility of reaching the state Success. We provide a full PRISM encoding of our
running example in Appendix A.2. In our running example the resiliency is com-
puted to be 51.16% with the probabilistic user availabilities given in Table 4,
Appendix A.4.
5 Empirical Assessment of Policy Changes
In this section we provide an empirical assessment of resiliency computation
time to help understanding of how it can be improved at runtime. In doing so
we investigate the impact upon computation time of adding security constraints
to the security policy.
Table 1. Result averages when applying randomly generated security policies to a
workflow with 10 tasks and 5 users
0 1∼5 6∼10 11∼15 16∼20 21∼25 26∼30 31∼35 36∼40 41∼45
Resiliency (%) 58.23 57.97 55.73 52.78 50.49 46.02 34.85 15.31 0.89 0
0% resiliency 0 0 0 1 0 11 90 305 488 500
Computation (s) 0.11 0.38 1.56 2.24 1.80 1.08 0.52 0.20 0.07 0.04
Build time (s) 0.56 2.83 16.12 25.91 21.72 13.81 7.52 4.38 2.55 1.78
Total time (s) 0.67 3.21 17.68 28.15 23.52 14.89 8.04 4.58 2.62 1.82
States 3893 58246 346992 600287 522850 332259 171627 89361 47140 29387
Transitions 73249 758351 3352889 4754705 3649065 2171394 1090709 561534 294596 182751
5.1 Assessment Methodology
We first consider one workflow with 10 tasks and 5 users. For simplicity we
only consider the addition of separation of duty constraints which is sufficient
to show the changes to resiliency computation time. The maximum number of
separation of duty constraints for a workflow of 10 tasks is 45 constraints. For
each i where 0 ≤ i ≤ 45 we generate 100 random security policies such that
the permissions policy P contains between 2 and 5 users for each task, the
separations of duty policy S contains i constraints, and the bindings of duty
policy B has 0 constraints. Each policy is applied to the workflow meaning in all
we analyse 4500 workflows using a computing platform incorporating a 2.40Ghz
i7-4500U Intel processor and 8GB RAM. To take into account any influence the
computing platform may have on analysis time, each analysis is repeated 50
times for each workflow and the average values taken.
In terms of user availability we use a dynamic availability model with proba-
bilities of between 0.8 and 1.0 for each user u to be available for a task t (Table 5,
Appendix A.4) . The resiliency of each workflow is calculated with an unmod-
ified version 4.2.1 of the PRISM model checker using the explicit engine. This
is suitable for models with a potentially very large state space, only a fraction
of which is actually reachable. A test program has been implemented which,
given a number of inputs (number of workflows, tasks, users, etc) creates the
required workflows with randomly generated security policies and generates the
corresponding PRISM definition files. Each file is passed in turn to the PRISM
model checker which logs the output composed of the resiliency value and other
computational values including computation time.
5.2 Results
The results shown in Table 1 are given for our workflow with random separa-
tion of duty constraints applied, from 0 to 45. To place the workflow resiliency
value and its computation time into perspective the following result averages are
provided:
– Resiliency : workflow resiliency value
– 0% resiliency : number of workflows unable to complete
– Computation : time to verify the state Success is reachable (Section 4)
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Fig. 5. Average computation times for a
workflow with 10 tasks and 5 users
– Build time : time to build PRISM model
– Total time : computation + build time
– States : number of reachable states in PRISM model
– Transitions : number of transitions between states
The following sections provide more detailed analysis of resiliency and com-
putation time.
Resiliency Analysis Note the resiliency returned by a single execution of a
workflow is the same as the average resiliency of 50 executions, in other words
the resiliency does not change due to fixed parameters. Each plot in Figure 4
therefore represents a set of workflows with the same resiliency value and the
same number of separation of duty constraints (although each workflow in the
set comes with a different set of constraints).
Figure 4 shows how in general, resiliency steadily reduces following an in-
cremental introduction of separation of duty constraints. For example, with no
constraints, the workflows generally have between 40 and 80% resiliency and
with 20 constraints between 30 and 70%. All the workflows with between 0 and
10 constraints are shown to be resilient to some degree and up to the point where
20 constraints are applied, all except 1 workflow have some resiliency.
Each plot where resiliency is zero indicates a set of workflows with the same
number of separation of duty constraints whose security policy prevents com-
pletion. For example, 2 out of 100 workflows with 21 constraints are unable to
complete, whilst 36 out of 100 are unable to complete with 30 constraints. No
workflow is resilient once 40 constraints have been applied, however some work-
flows do exist which have some resiliency even with up to 39 out of a possible 45
constraints. The results indicate that some separation of duty constraints can
be added or removed with no effect on resiliency.
Computation Time The overall time to compute the resiliency of a workflow
can be separated into the time it takes to construct the PRISM model from
the workflow definition (build time), and the time it takes to verify the finishing
property holds in model (computation time). If a change is made to the definition
before verification, PRISM automatically rebuilds and verifies the model so the
total time must be considered. However, once a model has been built and no
changes are made, it need not be rebuilt. This is useful where cached, pre-built
models can be imagined meaning only computation time need be taken into
account when making runtime assignments. It is this time we are interested in
improving.
Figure 5 shows how in general, the computation time increases and then
decreases despite an incremental introduction of separation of duty constraints.
The actual times measured are of course somewhat dependent on the efficiency
of the model checker used, in this case PRISM. The maximum average com-
putation time is 2.24 seconds with 11∼15 separation of duty constraints. With
zero constraints and 41∼45 constraints the average computation time is 0.11 and
0.04 seconds respectively. The latter results can intuitively be attributed to the
average 0% resiliency value when all 45 constraints are applied. However, even
with 26∼30 constraints and an average 34.85% resiliency, the average computa-
tion time is lower at 0.52 seconds than the time with 11∼15 constraints. This
would indicate the workflows are on average at their most complex in terms of
longest resiliency computation time when approximately 11∼15 separation of
duty constraints have been applied.
By observing the size of the model that PRISM must solve, in terms of
the number of states and transitions, the computation time can be put into
context. The maximum average of 2.24 seconds is the computation time taken
by PRISM to solve a model with an average 600287 states and 4.75 million
transitions. These two values are the maximum average values recorded for states
and transitions respectively. As one would expect, computation time appears to
be closely related to the size of the model meaning in order to reduce computation
time we must look to reduce the size of the model without losing resiliency. The
results do indicate that in some cases separation of duty constraints can be added
or removed to a workflow without any loss of resiliency.
6 Reducing Computation Time
In this section we provide a methodology to calculate a set of dummy security
policy constraints (e.g., redundant separation-of-duty constraints or removing
unused user-task permissions), in order to reduce the resiliency computation
time while maintaining the actual resiliency value.
It was shown in Section 5 that in some cases, separation of duty constraints
could be added to or removed from a workflow security policy. We are not in
a position to say which constraints can be removed as this may weaken the
security policy. Therefore we only consider strengthening the policy, in other
words adding separation of duty constraints and removing user-task permissions
Table 2. Average computation times and resiliency values when adding a single sep-
aration of duty constraint or removing a single permission from the running example
policy p1
p1 +(t2, t3) +(t2, t5) +(t3, t5) +(t1, t4) −(u4, t4) −(u4, t5) −(u2, t4) −(u1, t1)
Resiliency (%) 51.16 47.89 51.16 51.16 51.16 39.47 51.16 51.16 51.16
Computation (s) 0.11 0.109 0.141 0.11 0.063 0.047 0.121 0.11 0.062
which in effect can be removed at a later stage if necessary without any loss of
security.
6.1 Adding Separations of Duty
In our running example workflow w1 coming with probabilistic user availabil-
ities (Table 4, Appendix A.4), the resiliency is computed to be 51.16% at an
average computation time of 0.11 seconds, based on the average of 50 resiliency
calculations. Imagine we now add a new separation of duty constraint (t2, t3) to
give a new policy p2 = (P2, S2, B2) where P2 = P1, S2 = S1 ∪ {(t2, t3)}, and
B2 = B1. The resiliency of w1 coming with p2 is now computed to be 47.89% at
an average computation time of 0.109 seconds. In other words, the computation
time has reduced by 0.001 seconds but with a loss of 3.27% resiliency.
Now consider adding in turn some alternative separation of duty constraints
(t2, t5),(t3, t5) and (t1, t4) to p1 to give new policies p3, p4 and p5 respectively.
The resiliency values and average computation times are given in Table 2 where
+(t, t′) denotes the addition of a separation of duty constraint to p1, whilst
−(u, t) denotes the removal of a user-task permission from p1. The addition
of (t2, t5) to p1 (p3) results in no loss to resiliency but increases the average
computation time by 0.031 seconds. Adding (t3, t5) to p1 (p4) results in no loss
to resiliency nor any reduction of average computation time. However, adding
(t1, t4) to p1 (p5) results in no loss to resiliency yet a reduction to the average
computation time of 0.047 seconds.
6.2 Removing User Permissions
Similarly we now consider removing a user-task permission (u4, t4) to give a new
policy p6 = (P6, S6, B6) where P6 = P1 \ {(u4, t4)}, S6 = S1, and B6 = B1. The
resiliency of w1 coming with p6 is now computed to be 39.47% at an average
computation time of 0.047 seconds. In other words, the computation time has
reduced by 0.063 seconds but with a loss of 11.69% resiliency.
We now consider removing in turn some alternative user-task permissions
(u4, t5),(u2, t4) and (u1, t1) from p1 to give new policies p7, p8 and p9 respec-
tively. The resiliency values and average computation times are given in Table 2.
The removal of (u4, t5) from p1 (p7) results in no loss to resiliency but increases
the average computation time by 0.011 seconds to 0.121 seconds. Removing
Table 3. Average computation times and resiliency values when adding separation of
duty constraints or removing permissions from wB
wB +s1 +s2 +s3 −p1 −p2 −p3
Resiliency (%) 63.96 63.42 62.84 62.21 62.52 60.54 57.92
Computation (s) 6.53 4.28 3.55 3.29 5.09 3.83 1.76
(u2, t4) from p1 (p8) results in no loss to resiliency nor any reduction of av-
erage computation time. However, removing (u1, t1) from p1 (p9) results in no
loss to resiliency yet reduces the average computation time by 0.048 seconds to
0.062 seconds. These results indicate that a selective addition of separation of
duty constraints, or removal of user-task permissions can reduce the resiliency
computation time without any loss to the actual resiliency value.
6.3 Calculating Dummy Constraints
With the aid of a larger workflow example, we provide a method of calculating
an optimal set of dummy security policy constraints that minimises resiliency
computation time without any reduction to the resiliency value. For clarity we
calculate two optimal sets, one of redundant separation of duty constraints that
can be added to the policy, and one of user-task permissions that can be removed.
Our method could easily be modified to calculate a single set of optimal dummy
constraints composed of separation and binding of duty constraints, and user-
task permissions.
We consider a single base workflow wB with 10 tasks and 5 users, coming
with a randomly selected security policy pB composed of 15 separation of duty
constraints, 0 binding of duty constraints, and permissions for each task of up
to 4 users (29 permissions in total). We use a dynamic user availability model
such that each user has an availability for each task of between 0.8 and 1.0
(Table 5, Appendix A.4). The resiliency values and computation times of wB
and all forthcoming variations of it are analysed 50 times and the average values
taken. We also use the same computing platform and PRISM model checker
set-up as described in Section 5.1. The resiliency of wB is calculated as 63.96%
with an average computation time of 6.53 seconds.
Separations of Duty A test program has been implemented which, given a
base workflow, e.g. wB , calculates monotonically all possible separation of duty
constraint combinations that can be added to the workflow security policy. All
combinations include only constraints not already included in the base workflow’s
security policy. In the case of wB , the maximum number of constraints is 45
meaning up to 30 can be added. All possible combinations of between 1 and 30
constraints are therefore computed. For each of these a PRISM definition file is
automatically generated and analysed by the PRISM model checker. Results are
logged for resiliency value, computation time and the set of constraints added
to wB .
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The average results of this analysis step are given in Table 3 where the val-
ues given for +si indicate the average resiliency and computation time for i
separation of duty constraints added to wB . Similarly, values for −pi indicate
the average resiliency and computation time for i user-task permissions removed
from wB . For clarity we only show the impact on computation time of up to
3 additional separation of duty constraints and the removal of up to 3 permis-
sions. In general, adding arbitrary separation of duty constraints in a monotonic
fashion is shown to reduce the resiliency computation time but this comes with
a reduction in resiliency.
Finding a set of dummy constraints that reduces computation time with-
out reducing resiliency value is found from performing an automatic double sort
on the results, first by resiliency value (largest to smallest) and then by time
(smallest to largest). The set of dummy constraints that does not change re-
siliency yet gives the lowest computation time for each i additional constraints
is shown in Figure 6. For example, adding the constraint (t3, t4) has on average
the minimum computation time for one change, that of 2.58 seconds. Notice for
three additional constraints, adding {(t1, t3), (t3, t4), (t3, t8)} achieves the mini-
mal computation time of 1.52 seconds, thus reducing the original computation
time for wB by 5.01 seconds without lowering its resiliency value.
User-Task Permissions Similarly to adding separation of duty constraints,
the results in Table 3 show in general removing arbitrary user-task permissions
in a monotonic fashion reduces the resiliency computation time but with a re-
duction in resiliency. The set of removable permissions shown to give the lowest
computation time for each i permissions removed is given in Figure 7. For exam-
ple, removing the permission (u5, t6) has on average the minimum computation
time for one change, that of 3.44 seconds. Notice for three permissions, remov-
ing {(u5, t1), (u3, t2), (u1, t5)} achieves the minimal computation time of 0.63
seconds, thus reducing the original computation time by 5.90 seconds without
lowering the resiliency value.
7 Conclusion
We have shown that the way a workflow security policy is designed has a clear
impact on the time required to compute the workflow resiliency, which might
need to be done at runtime before the execution of each task, in order to ensure
that the user-task assignment is suitable. Our results rely on a systematic en-
coding of a workflow as a probabilistic model and use the ability of the model
checker PRISM to efficiently compute resiliency.
We consider this process to be useful in two settings, firstly the workflow de-
sign process allowing domain and security experts to assess how resiliency com-
putation time would be impacted following restrictive and unrestrictive changes
to the security policy. Secondly, we have proposed an approach adding dummy
or artificial security constraints, in order to reduce the computation time. The
gain in time can be significant, for instance in our experiment reducing the com-
putation time from 6.53 seconds to 0.63 seconds.
Our experimental results are based on a synthetic workflow, and although it
is inspired by real workflows, nothing guarantees that the same efficiency can be
gained for all workflows. Hence, we believe our main contribution is the method-
ology to encode a workflow and to automatically assess its resiliency, based on
one of the major probabilistic model-checkers. In the end, the trade-off between
resiliency and efficiency can only be resolved by the workflow designer/executer,
and we believe that our approach can be helpful in that direction.
In terms of future work we aim to introduce more complex security con-
straints including cardinality, restricting the number of times a user can be as-
signed a specific task, to assess their impact on resiliency computation time. We
also plan to consider more complex workflows, for instance including loops and
choice tasks. These features tend to introduce another level of non-determinism
in the execution of the workflow itself, and present as such some challenging
aspects in their analysis.
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A Workflow Prism Model
Here we provide an overview of the PRISM modelling language and give an
encoding of the workflow assignment process defined in Section 4. We also show
how PRISM can convert this model definition into an MDP and solve it using
its own property specification language to indicate the resiliency of a workflow.
A.1 PRISM Modelling Language
A PRISM model definition constitutes a number of interactive modules that
contain one or more local variables and commands as follows:
module name
variables
commands
endmodule
The values of a module’s local variables define the module’s state while the
values of all variables across every module determines the global state of the
model. Each variable is defined with a name, a type restricted to a finite range
of integers or a Boolean, and an initial value:
name : type init value
The initial state for the model is therefore defined by the initial values of
all variables. The behaviour of a module is described through a set of local
commands. Each command contains a guard and one or more updates, taking
the form:
[label] guard →update1 & ... & updaten;
A guard is a predicate over both local variables and those contained in other
modules. If a command’s guard equates to true, the guard’s corresponding up-
dates take place assigning one or more local variables with new values. Updating
variables is equivalent to a state transition causing the model to move from its
current state to a new state. Labelling commands across modules with a common
label allows those commands to be synchronised such that a transition consists
of all these commands operating in parallel. Such a transition will only occur
when the guards of all its constituent commands equate to true. A guard of
the form true is an empty guard that always equates to true; commands with
such a guard are used to update local variables regardless of their current value.
These commands can still be synchronised with others through labelling. A mod-
ule containing several commands whose guards all equate to true will make a
nondeterministic choice over which command to perform.
Named expressions or formulas can be included in a PRISM model to avoid
the duplication of code and reduce the state space. Essentially a formula’s ex-
pression can be substituted by its name where ever the expression would be
expected.
formula name = expression;
A.2 Workflow Encoding
We now provide a PRISM encoding of the assignment process described in Sec-
tion 4 using the running example workflow in Section 3. The process is driven by
the module main where the Boolean variables nt and pc used as flags for correct
transition ordering, can be read as ready for next task and policy has been checked
respectively. The formula pol is true when an assignment (u, t) satisfies the se-
curity policy and the variable fail indicates whether the workflow has failed due
to a policy violation. Note the command labels are are used to synchronise with
commands in other modules and can be loosely read as: [ s ] next step; [p] check
policy; [a] make assignment; [e] end workflow; [ f ] fail workflow.
module main
nt : bool init true ;
pc : bool init false ;
fail : bool init false ;
[ s ] nt → (nt’=false) & (pc’=false);
[p] !nt & !pc → (pc’=true);
[a] !nt & pc & pol → (nt’=true);
[e] nt → true ;
[ f ] !nt & pc & !pol & ! fail → ( fail ’=true);
endmodule
Tasks The PRISM module tasks selects the next workflow task. Due to the
variable type restrictions in PRISM we define the set of tasks T as a finite
sequence of integers. The workflow tasks t1, . . . , tn where n = |T | are represented
by the values 1, . . . , n while the workflow’s termination point is represented by
-1. The current task is stored in a variable t, initialised as 0:
t : [−1..n] init 0;
In order to satisfy the task ordering relation < and record which tasks have been
executed, a Boolean variable is defined for each task such that true indicates a
task has been executed and false that it has not. For any task ti we define a
variable ti, initialised as false :
ti : bool init false ;
To enable the selection of a task ti as the next task in a workflow, a command
[ s ] is defined as follows:
[ s ] ! ti & tj & . . . & tm →(t’=i)&(ti’=true);
To allow a workflow to terminate, two commands [e] and [ f ] are defined
which set t to the termination point -1 as follows:
[e] tn →(t’=−1);
[ f ] true → (t’=−1);
The command [e] executes only if t is the last task in the workflow tn indicating
the workflow has ended successfully with all tasks performed. The command [ f ]
executes only if the synchronised command [ f ] in the main module equates to
true, indicating the workflow has failed and terminated early without all tasks
performed. In our running example the module tasks is defined as follows:
module tasks
t : [−1..5] init 0;
t1 : bool init false ;
...
t5 : bool init false ;
[ s ] !t1 → (t’=1)&(t1’=true);
[ s ] t1 & !t2 → (t’=2)&(t2’=true);
[ s ] t1 & !t4 → (t’=4)&(t4’=true);
[ s ] t2 & !t3 → (t’=3)&(t3’=true);
[ s ] t3 & t4 & !t5 → (t’=5)&(t5’=true);
[e] t5 → (t’=−1);
[ f ] true → (t’=−1);
endmodule
Users The PRISM module candidate selects a user for the next task. We define
the set of users U as a finite sequence of integers 1, . . . , n where n = |U |. The
user selected is assigned to a variable pu read as perspective user, initialised as
0:
pu : [0.. n] init 0;
For simplicity we do not consider a ’smart’ approach to selecting the optimal
user for a user-task assignment but instead leave this to PRISM to solve for us,
given the correct properties to check. Instead we allow allow any u ∈ U to be
selected and assigned to pu. Adding a command with an empty guard (true) for
any user ui means the update of pu is nondeterministic, as follows:
[ s ] true → (pu’=i);
In our running example the candidate module as follows:
module candidate
pu : [0..4] init 0;
[ s ] true → (pu’=1);
[ s ] true → (pu’=2);
[ s ] true → (pu’=3);
[ s ] true → (pu’=4);
endmodule
Permissions Modelling permissions in PRISM is carried out by defining a
separate formula to capture the user-task permissions for a task. Given a task
ti and a permissions policy P , the user-task permissions for task ti are captured
in a permissions formula pi as follows:
formula pi = t=i & (pu=j | . . . | pu=k);
Each user u in the conjunction pu=uj | . . . |pu=uk is defined in a permission
(u, ti) ∈ P such that u ∈ up(ti). The permission pi is therefore true if t is the
current task (i.e., t=i) and the selected user pu ∈ up(ti). Evaluating the entire
permissions policy P is encapsulated by the formula perms which is a conjunction
of all permission formulas p1, . . . ,pk, equating to true when no permission has
been violated:
formula perms = pj | . . . | pk;
Constraints Each separation of duty constraint (t, t′) ∈ S is defined in a dis-
tinct PRISM module si. Placing each separation of duty constraint in a distinct
module allows for easy addition of new constraints and removal of current ones.
Evaluating whether a separation (t, t′) is satisfied makes it necessary to record
the user who executes the first task of the pair (either t or t′). When the second
task is to be performed it is possible to verify the user being assigned to the
second task is different from the one who performed the first. Note it is not
necessary to record users performing any task that does not have a separation
(or binding) of duty with any other task.
Given a separation of duty pair (t, t′) ∈ S, the user who executes the first
task in the pair is recorded in a variable usi read as the user of separation of
duty i, initialised as 0:
usi : [0.. n] init 0;
The variable usi can potentially be assigned any u ∈ U so an integer sequence
1, . . . , n is used where n = |U |. Recording whether the separation constraint has
been violated is recorded by a Boolean variable fs i read as failed separation of
duty i which is false if si is satisfied or true if si has been violated:
fs i : bool init false ;
When evaluating a separation of duty constraint, three commands labelled
[p] are defined such that only one will execute:
[p] (t=j | t=k) & usi=0 →(usi’=pu);
[p] (t=j | t=k) & usi!=0 & pu=usi →(fsi’=true);
[p] (t!=j & t!=k) | (usi!=0 & pu!=usi) →true;
Given (ti, tj) ∈ S, the first command records the user pu when t is ti or tj and
neither task has been performed. The second command records the constraint
has been violated when pu is the same as usi and the third command does nothing
when the constraint is satisfied or t is neither ti or tj . In our running example,
the constraint (t2, t4) ∈ S1 is defined as:
module s1
us1 : [0..4] init 0;
fs1 : bool init false ;
[p] (t=2 | t=4) & us1=0 →(us1’=pu);
[p] (t=2 | t=4) & us1!=0 & pu=us1 →(fs1’=true);
[p] (t!=2 & t!=4) | (us1!=0 & pu!=us1) →true;
endmodule
Checking the entire separations of duty policy S is encapsulated by the for-
mula sods which is a conjunction of all fs1,. . .,fsn variables defined in modules
s1, . . . , sn:
formula sods = !fs1 & . . . & !fsn;
The formula sods equates to true when no separation of duty constraint has
been violated, in other words all variables fs1,. . . , fsn are false . Similarly, each
binding of duty constraint (t, t′) ∈ B is defined in a distinct PRISM module bi:
module bi
ubi : [0.. n] init 0;
fbi : bool init false ;
[p] (t=j | t=k) & ubi=0 →(ubi’=pu);
[p] (t=j | t=k) & ubi!=0 & pu!=ubi →(fb i’=true);
[p] (t!=j & t!=k) | (ubi!=0 & pu=ubi) →true;
endmodule
Note the Boolean variable fbi read as failed binding of duty i is true if bi has
been violated, in other words the user for tj and tk is different. The formula bods
encapsulates the binding of duty policy B for all modules b1, . . . , bn, equating
to true when no binding of duty has been violated, in other words all variables
fb1,. . . ,fbn are false:
formula bods = !fb1 & . . . & !fbn;
Policy Having defined the formulas perms, sods and bods we are able to evalute
the workflow security policy p = (P, S,B) by defining a formula pol:
formula pol = perms & sods & bods;
The policy formula pol equates to true only if a given user-task assignment
satisfies the permissions, separation and binding of duties constraints. Note how
pol is used by the main module as a guard in the [a] and [ f ] commands to evaluate
whether an assignment can be made or the workflow has failed respectively.
Probabilistic Availability In order to calculate a workflow’s resiliency we
extend our PRISM model to include a probabilistic user unavailability model.
PRISM allows probabilistic variable updates with commands of the form:
[label] guard →prob1 : update1 + ... + probn : updaten;
This states the probability of update1 is prob1 and so forth such that the
sum of prob1 to probn is 1. Only one of the updates will take place with its given
probability assuming the guard is true. For example, a Boolean variable available
has a probability of 0.75 to be true and 0.25 to be false with a command of the
form:
[label] guard →0.75 :(available’=true) + 0.25 :(available’=false);
Full details of encoding user availability are given in [?].
A.3 Model Building and Verification
The property we wish to verify is defined in PRISM as:
Pmax=? [ F (t=−1) & (!fail) ]
where: Pmax =? asks PRISM to find the maximal probability of the formula in
between brackets to be true; the operator F is the “Eventually” operator, i.e.,
F p is true if the statement p eventually holds in the system. In this case, we ask
PRISM to find the maximal property so that, eventually, the termination point
has been reached, (t=−1) and the workflow has not failed, (! fail ).
In order to verify the satisfiability property, PRISM first builds the corre-
sponding model by converting a given definition into an MDP. To do this PRISM
computes the set of all reachable states from the initial state of the model and
the transition matrix which represents the model. The transition matrix contains
probabilities for all state transitions in the model. A non-zero entry represents
the probability of going from state i to state j, row i to column j in the matrix.
Verification of the MDP is based on exhaustive search and numerical solution.
As we are solving the MDP to find the maximum probability we do not require a
reward function. The numerical result returned by PRISM is the value calculated
in the initial state of the MDP.
A.4 Probabilities for User Availability
Table 4. User probabilistic availabilities used to compute resiliency for running exam-
ple workflow w1 in Sections 4, 6.1 and 6.2
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5
u1 0.9568 0.8338 0.7206 0.7231 0.7099
u2 0.8565 0.9210 0.8016 0.8091 0.9460
u3 0.8263 0.8617 0.7705 0.7192 0.7117
u4 0.7238 0.8999 0.9486 0.8413 0.8063
Table 5. User probabilistic availabilities used to compute resiliency when assessing
policy changes (Section 5) and for the base workflow wB (Section 6.3)
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10
u1 0.9297 0.9996 0.8506 0.8737 0.9057 0.8365 0.9514 0.8555 0.9665 0.9875
u2 0.8381 0.8883 0.8231 0.8726 0.8099 0.9732 0.9852 0.8506 0.9825 0.8089
u3 0.9653 0.9246 0.8429 0.9491 0.9597 0.8394 0.8560 0.9585 0.8304 0.8330
u4 0.9263 0.9691 0.8241 0.9932 0.9868 0.9792 0.9162 0.9339 0.9868 0.8049
u5 0.9724 0.8817 0.9401 0.8261 0.9339 0.8432 0.9329 0.8682 0.8231 0.8842
